

# Request Fulfilling: When Citizens Demand Clientelist Benefits

Simeon Nichter<sup>1</sup> and Michael Peress<sup>2</sup>

## Abstract

Traditional accounts of clientelism typically focused on patron–client relations with minimal scope for citizen autonomy. Despite the heightened agency of many contemporary citizens, most studies continue to depict clientelism as a phenomenon that is firmly under elite control. The prevailing tendency is to view clientelism as a top-down process in which machines target citizens with offers of material benefits. Without denying the importance of elites, we emphasize the role of citizen demands in clientelism. Citizens often approach machines of their own volition to ask for help and may vote for a competitor if requests are unfulfilled. In response to these citizens, machines often engage in what we call “request fulfilling.” Interviews with citizens and politicians, coupled with cross-national survey data from Africa and Latin America, suggest the importance of this phenomenon. In addition, Argentine survey data in studies by Stokes and Nichter are better explained by request fulfilling than alternative explanations.

## Keywords

clientelism, machine politics, Latin America, Argentina, Brazil, elections, public opinion, voting behavior, corruption and patronage

---

<sup>1</sup>University of California, San Diego, CA, USA

<sup>2</sup>Stony Brook University, NY, USA

## Corresponding Author:

Simeon Nichter, Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, Social Sciences Building 301, 9500 Gilman Drive #0521, La Jolla, CA 92093-0521, USA.

Email: nichter@ucsd.edu

## Introduction

If you had 200 votes, then your family becomes 200 people. You have an obligation to serve those people, because the day that you stop serving one of those people, you've lost that vote . . . if he asks for medicine, you have to give it. If he asks for food, you have to give it. If you don't give it, then you've lost that voter.

—Councilor in Brazil<sup>1</sup>

In many countries, politicians deliver clientelist benefits in direct exchange for political support. This familiar pattern of machine politics often diverges from how many observers expect democracy to function. Democratic elections ostensibly enhance accountability by enabling voters to punish parties for programmatic reasons, such as the failure to deliver collective goods. Yet clientelism often entails a different logic of accountability, with a focus on particularism rather than collectivity (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). As a Brazilian councilor explains above, supporters can punish politicians who fail to fulfill requests for individualistic benefits. When the state fails to provide a social safety net, many citizens rely on such forms of clientelist accountability.

The councilor's description of being held accountable to citizen demands contrasts sharply with many traditional accounts of clientelism. In past decades, studies typically examined severely asymmetric relations between patrons and clients, which provided minimal scope for citizen autonomy (e.g., Cornelius, 1977; Powell, 1970). For instance, citizens' ability to make demands or turn against patrons was substantially restricted in contexts where wealthy landowners controlled peasants through land-tenure arrangements. Yet some scholars have long emphasized that the degree to which elites dictated the terms of clientelist exchanges was neither uniform nor static. In Southeast Asia, James Scott (1972) identified a continuum of citizen autonomy in clientelism: "At the one end are the clients with virtually no choice but to follow the patron who directly controls their means of subsistence," in the middle are citizens with "some bargaining power," and at the other end "the client emerges as more nearly an independent actor whose demands will receive a full hearing from his patron" (pp. 99-100). In addition to such heterogeneity, observers witnessed a decline in elite control over clients in various settings (e.g., Archer, 1990; Gay, 2006; Scott, 1972). Greater citizen autonomy is also explored in some contemporary qualitative work on clientelism; for instance, Piattoni (2001) emphasizes a continuum of relative power in patron-client relations, Taylor-Robinson (2010) discusses why some clients may be able to seek out alternative patrons, and Hilgers (2012) observes reduced power differentials between patrons and clients in some environments.

While few scholars would deny the fact that voter autonomy has grown in some contexts with clientelism, recent formal and quantitative research rarely

reflects citizens' heightened agency. Instead, studies continue to depict clientelism as a phenomenon that is firmly under elite control. As such, clientelism is typically viewed as a top-down process in which machines choose which citizens to target during an electoral campaign with non-negotiable offers of material benefits. For example, Stokes's (2005) research on vote buying argues that machines target weakly opposed voters and reward them for switching their votes. By contrast, Nichter (2008) contends that machines engage in turnout buying—rewarding nonvoting supporters to induce electoral participation. The top-down perspective is similarly adopted by research on why elites might eschew a unilateral targeting strategy and instead employ a portfolio of clientelist tactics (Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, & Magaloni, 2016; Gans-Morse, Mazza, & Nichter, 2014), as well as by research on why elites might target reciprocal citizens (Finan & Schechter, 2012). Recent work by Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, and Brusco (2013) also focuses on elite targeting strategies, arguing that party leaders' efforts to target weakly opposed voters are thwarted by brokers who find it easier to deliver rewards to supporters.

While this influential strand of research on elite targeting has yielded important contributions, its top-down approach provides few insights about how citizens with sufficient autonomy might shape machine politics. Without denying the importance of elites, we focus squarely on the role of citizen demands in clientelism during electoral campaigns. This article explores how citizens often approach machines of their own volition to ask for handouts to fulfill some need, and argues that such bottom-up requests have important effects on clientelism. While some existing excellent studies provide brief qualitative examples of citizen requests (e.g., Auyero, 2000; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012), the present article is the first to focus on this phenomenon and to analyze citizen requests formally and quantitatively.

Our focus on citizen requests also provides insight into an intriguing puzzle that emerges when employing the prevailing top-down approach. If clientelism merely involves elite targeting, why do machines expend scarce resources delivering benefits to citizens who are predisposed to turn out and vote for the machine? Most recent work sidesteps a crucial empirical observation that the present article investigates extensively: evidence from around the world demonstrates that machines predominantly distribute benefits to supporters who reliably turn out.<sup>2</sup> By investigating *citizen-initiated* exchanges, we offer an important explanation—which we term “request fulfilling”—as to why parties deliver benefits to their own voting supporters. Citizens frequently request help from machines during campaigns and may threaten to cast votes for competitors if their requests are unfulfilled. When citizens initiate clientelist exchanges, our analyses suggest that machines predominantly fulfill the requests of voting supporters.

A mixed-methods approach is employed to examine the logic of citizen-initiated exchanges and request fulfilling. First, we provide extensive qualitative evidence from fieldwork in Brazil and Argentina offering intuition about how citizens initiate requests and why politicians often feel pressure to comply. Second, we develop the first formal model of request fulfilling, utilizing insights gleaned from qualitative analysis to guide modeling assumptions. Third, we test empirical implications of the request-fulfilling model using regression analyses of three prominent datasets. This integration of qualitative, formal, and quantitative methods distinguishes our study from all previous work on the role of citizens in clientelism.

The empirical implications of our theoretical model deserve emphasis, because they offer new insights into how citizen demands can shape clientelism. Our model suggests that when citizens ask for particularistic benefits, (a) machines are most likely to fulfill requests of supporters, (b) they fulfill requests of likely voters, (c) they fulfill requests of the poor, and (d) they fulfill requests where monitoring vote choices is easiest. These findings are robust to various modeling assumptions, including a generalized model allowing for any distribution of ideological preferences and a broad range of utility functions. An advance of our formal analysis is that it applies to both monopolistic and competitive clientelism. Although nearly all existing models assume that only one machine distributes rewards (e.g., Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, & Estévez, 2007; Stokes, 2005), this assumption is inapplicable to some contexts. For example, Kitschelt's (2011a) impressive cross-national survey identifies numerous countries with competitive clientelism, including Hungary, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Taiwan. We demonstrate that our model's predictions extend to both monopolistic and competitive clientelism.

Beyond formal contributions, the present study contributes to empirical research on clientelism. First, we provide qualitative evidence from interviews of citizens and elites emphasizing how citizens often initiate clientelist exchanges. Then, we reanalyze Argentine survey data in Stokes (2005) and Nichter (2008) and subject the request-fulfilling explanation to additional tests using broader evidence and improved measures. An important new test of request fulfilling reveals that Argentines asking for help disproportionately receive clientelist benefits. Finally, we broaden the scope of empirical analysis beyond existing work, demonstrating that request fulfilling is consistent with data across Africa and Latin America. Using cross-national survey data is feasible because our model derives predictions holding for *both* monopolistic and competitive clientelism.

The present study by no means claims that citizen demands and request fulfilling account for *all* patterns of clientelism. First, we recognize that machines frequently initiate exchanges to influence citizen behavior. However, we argue that much of what is depicted as top-down strategies such

as vote buying or turnout buying is actually machines responding to citizen requests. Second, as with many recent studies, we focus on “electoral” clientelism, in which all contingent benefits are delivered during election campaigns. We acknowledge that both elites and citizens may initiate exchanges as part of “relational” clientelism, which involves benefits extending beyond election campaigns (Nichter, 2014). For example, studies including Banfield and Wilson (1963), Scott (1969), and Levitsky (2003b) explore how politicians provide ongoing benefits to their constituents in direct exchange for political support. Thus, while we have no illusions that request fulfilling accounts for all clientelist exchanges, we argue that it is an understudied phenomenon with important implications. To motivate formal and quantitative analyses, we first provide qualitative evidence of request fulfilling.

## Request Fulfilling in Brazil and Argentina

### Brazil

Our theory of request fulfilling emerged from 18 months of qualitative research in Northeast Brazil, so we first provide intuition of the phenomenon by discussing more than 130 interviews of citizens and elites in the states of Bahia and Pernambuco.<sup>3</sup> Particularistic goods are frequently distributed during Brazilian campaigns, with both citizens and politicians initiating clientelist exchanges. In a recent national survey, more than 13% of respondents admitted to voting for a candidate in exchange for a benefit.<sup>4</sup> Brazil’s electoral governance body (*Tribunal Superior Eleitoral*) removed nearly 700 politicians from office for distributing benefits during campaigns between 2000 and 2008 (Movimento de Combate à Corrupção Eleitoral, 2009).

Citizens frequently initiate clientelist exchanges by requesting benefits from politicians during campaigns. A survey in rural Northeast Brazil revealed that more than 21% of respondents requested particularistic benefits directly of municipal candidates during the 2012 election year.<sup>5</sup> One mayor we interviewed explained, “Who asks is the voter. It’s not the candidate who offers.”<sup>6</sup> Requests are varied, explains a councilor: “There are requests for tires, requests for medicine, requests for food baskets. There are requests for everything.”<sup>7</sup> Another councilor showed us a note received from a supporter before the election: “I need material. One door with hinges and a lock. Two sacks of cement. Plain green paint. At 8 pm I will go to your house today.”<sup>8</sup> Many citizens reported asking candidates for help in various locations: in their own homes during campaign visits, when encountering candidates on the street, in politicians’ offices, and in *comitês* (local campaign offices). A citizen explained, “They aren’t going to offer help to anyone . . . Really, if you want help, go to the *comitê* and ask for help.”<sup>9</sup>

Many politicians emphasized that they had to fulfill requests to maintain their supporters and expressed fear of backlash if they did not comply. As the politician in this article's epigraph remarked about supporters, "The day that you stop serving one of those people, you've lost that vote."<sup>10</sup> Another councilor remarked, "A dog is only his owner's friend because the owner feeds him. The day the owner stops feeding him, he'll go behind someone else who gives him food."<sup>11</sup> In a sentiment shared by numerous politicians, one councilor complained that he was held "hostage" by supporters' requests.<sup>12</sup> Another explained when running for office, "I had various voters who pressured me—if you don't give me, then I won't vote for you."<sup>13</sup> Politicians complained that even a supporter they helped for years could easily turn against them if a campaign request went unfulfilled. A mayor recounted how one candidate had earlier given a supporter a bicycle. The candidate refused to replace its flat tire two weeks before the election. The citizen became disgruntled and voted for a competitor who fulfilled the tire request.<sup>14</sup> Given such potential backlash, several politicians admitted to violating laws against distributing benefits during campaigns. For example, a politician explained how he dealt with campaign requests from supporters:

If a sick person arrived . . . and I know this person always helped me, how could I not help? I'd say, "Look, I'll give you the medicine, here is the money, don't tell that I gave it to you, because this is prohibited by the Electoral Court . . . I knew that if I didn't give I would lose the family's vote. I had to give something."<sup>15</sup>

Overall, this evidence indicates that citizens frequently request handouts during Brazilian campaigns, and local politicians often face pressure to fulfill supporters' requests.

## *Argentina*

Over the past decade, many influential studies of clientelism have examined the case of Argentina. Although these studies almost invariably focus on politicians as initiating clientelist exchanges, some mention a key point that remains largely unexplored. As in Brazil, citizens often request clientelist benefits.

Before discussing citizen requests, the existence of clientelism in Argentina should first be underscored. In a prominent survey, more than 44% of survey respondents reported that political operatives distributed goods in their neighborhood during the 2001 campaign, and 7% admitted personally receiving goods (Brusco, Nazareno, & Stokes, 2004). The Peronist party is Argentina's dominant machine party; it is by far the most active distributor of benefits (Stokes, 2005) and has far more operatives than any other party (Calvo &

Murillo, 2013). To provide ongoing social assistance to constituents—much of which is clientelist (Levitsky, 2003a, 2003b)—the Peronist party uses extensive networks of *unidades básicas* (“base units”) and brokers. As Auyero (2000) explains, these are “centers from which food and medicine are distributed, and brokers can be approached for small favors all year around” (p. 83). Peronist brokers frequently fulfill followers’ requests, thereby providing “problem-solving networks” for the poor (Auyero, 2000; see also Zarazaga, 2014).

As in Brazil, many Argentines initiate clientelist exchanges by requesting benefits. Landini (2012) reports that numerous farmers interviewed in Argentina requested help of politicians during campaigns; as one explained, “In this moment if you don’t take advantage of [the election] and ask, they won’t give you anything” (p. 210). Rodrigo Zarazaga, a researcher of clientelism in Argentina, reports that one-third of his 120 interviews with brokers were interrupted by clients asking for benefits.<sup>16</sup> During one of his unpublished interviews, an operative nicknamed *El Tigre* (Tiger) expressed exasperation about citizen requests faced during campaigns:

Now the elections make me crazy. They know I have a lot of resources. Everyone comes and requests and I fulfill. There is a funeral and they come looking for me. They need money, El Tigre. They need zinc sheets, El Tigre. They need food handouts, El Tigre. Everything is El Tigre.<sup>17</sup>

Similarly, Auyero (2000) describes how citizens frequently request help, explaining followers “contact a broker when problems arise or when a special favor is needed (a food package, some medicine, a driver’s license, the water truck, getting a friend out of jail, etc.)” (p. 94). Stokes et al. (2013) suggest that Argentine brokers often employ a political logic when responding to such requests, opting to “mete out their time and assistance preferentially” (p. 106). Excellent studies by Szwarcberg (2013) and Weitz-Shapiro (2012) also provide brief qualitative examples of requests to mayors and councilors in the context of clientelism in Argentina.

As in Brazil, Peronist operatives often face pressure to fulfill supporters’ requests and potential backlash for noncompliance. One explained that followers “support you because you support them. I can’t let down the people who follow me and help me.”<sup>18</sup> Another operative shared potential consequences of noncompliance:

I know I always have to have something . . . food handouts, because at any time they knock on the door of my house. I know that when they bang on the door they come hungry, so I have to have food to give. When you don’t have a response they go with another. It is a lot of pressure one feels to respond.<sup>19</sup>

In short, Peronist operatives face pressure to fulfill supporters' requests.

Survey data also reveal request fulfilling in Argentina. Although Stokes et al. (2013) do not consider any implications of citizen-initiated exchanges, their survey of approximately 800 brokers provides evidence of the phenomenon (pp. 105-106). The survey included the following two questions:

1. "Out of every 10 voters that you have ever helped, how many asked for help directly?"
2. "Out of every 10 voters that you have ever helped, to how many have you extended help without them asking for it?"


Based on these questions, Stokes et al. (2013) suggest that exchanges are predominantly *citizen-initiated*: "More brokers identify requests as originating with voters than the other way around" (p. 105). The Argentine survey analyzed by Stokes (2005) and Nichter (2008) also points to request fulfilling. Respondents were asked whether they had turned to local political patrons or brokers for help over the past year. Citizens who requested help were nearly three times as likely as nonrequesters to receive campaign handouts (16.1% vs. 5.7%). Moreover, Figure 1 shows that rewards were disproportionately received by citizens who requested help *and* held favorable opinions of the Peronist party.<sup>20</sup> As explored below, this relationship is consistent with request-fulfilling predictions and is robust to various controls using regression analyses. Building on this motivating evidence, we turn to formal analyses.

## Formal Model of Request Fulfilling

This section develops a model of request fulfilling and presents empirical implications, which are later tested with Argentine and cross-national data. Unlike all existing models of clientelism, our formal analysis examines implications when citizens initiate requests for benefits and have sufficient autonomy to withhold political support when their requests are unfulfilled.

To provide an overview, this section considers a two-stage model. In the first stage, citizens with sufficient autonomy to withhold political support submit requests for benefits from a machine. In the second stage, the machine then decides which citizens' requests to fulfill. The model is solved using backward induction, and thus begins by evaluating the second stage. When fulfilling requests, the machine secures the most votes by expending its budget on the cheapest citizens. During the first stage, citizens foresee this logic, and thus realize that the machine will fulfill their demands if sufficiently low. Citizens who are predisposed to vote for the machine are most easily placated and submit relatively small requests. By contrast, citizens who oppose the machine on





**Figure 1.** Rewards received, requesters versus non-requesters (by opinion of Peronist party).

Source. Data from Stokes (2005).

Note. "Requesters" reported turning to a broker or local political patron for help during the past year ("Non-Requesters" had not). Opinion of Peronist party is from a closed-ended question.

ideological grounds are unwilling to vote for the machine unless relatively large requests are fulfilled. As a result, the model predicts that when citizens initiate clientelist demands, the machine predominantly fulfills requests of its own supporters. Several additional implications are also discussed below.

### Monopolistic Clientelism

In many countries, such as South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey (Kitschelt, 2011a), only one party delivers clientelist benefits. We first examine request fulfilling assuming such monopolistic clientelism, and later investigate competitive clientelism. We assume that two parties compete for office: a machine (*M*) and a non-clientelistic opposition party (*O*). Policy outcomes are characterized by a one-dimensional ideological spectrum ranging from 0 to 1. By assumption, the machine's policy platform is 0, and the opposition's policy platform is 1.

Voters are characterized by their ideal points, *x*, assumed to be uniformly distributed on the 0 to 1 interval. The utility a voter receives from voting for the machine is given as  $u_x^M(b) = -|x - 0| + \gamma b = -x + \gamma b$ , where  $b \geq 0$  denotes the amount the machine pays her and  $\gamma > 0$  is the weight she places on particularistic benefits in her utility function. Given that the opposition in

this case does not distribute rewards, the utility a voter receives from voting for the opposition is as follows:  $u_x^O = -|x - 1| = -(1 - x)$ .<sup>21</sup>

Our request-fulfilling model departs from existing formal analyses of clientelism and assumes that the voter moves first by initiating a request for a particularistic benefit. The machine then responds by deciding whether to fulfill the request of a given citizen. This assumption about the order of play is empirically grounded in fieldwork from Argentina and Brazil discussed above, which suggests that citizens frequently initiate clientelistic exchanges. We assume that each voter makes a request of  $\lambda(x)$  pesos, where  $\lambda(x) \in [0, \infty]$ , and votes for the machine if and only if her request is fulfilled.<sup>22</sup> Theoretical justifications for the assumption include reciprocity and monitoring: Citizens' voting behavior may be influenced by feelings of positive or negative reciprocity (e.g., Finan & Schechter, 2012; Lawson & Greene, 2014), and machines may deter recipients' opportunistic defection through monitoring (e.g., Stokes, 2005; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012). This assumption reflects qualitative evidence from Argentina and Brazil presented above, as numerous political operatives expressed fear that they would lose even supporters' votes if they failed to fulfill requests. Likewise, Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2016) argue that core supporters' loyalty in Mexico is conditional on receiving benefits, and a survey by Stokes et al. (2013) reveals that more than half of councilors and brokers in Argentina—and nearly two-thirds in Misiones province—believe that some, many, or all core supporters would change their party preference if not receiving further handouts.<sup>23</sup>

Next, the machine moves and decides whether to provide a benefit to a given voter, and if so, what size of payment. The machine determines how much to pay each voter for every possible profile of requests. Formally, voter requests can be summarized by a function  $\lambda$ , where  $\lambda(x)$  indicates the amount requested by a voter with ideal point  $x$ . The machine's strategy is a map  $b_\lambda$  from voters' requests  $\lambda$  (the history of the game at that stage) to a schedule of payments. For each history  $\lambda$ , the machine chooses a payment  $b_\lambda(x)$  for each voter in the electorate according to her ideal point  $x$ . The map  $b_\lambda$  is different for each history  $\lambda$ , indicating that the machine will respond to each voter depending on the requests all other voters have made.

When a voter makes a request, her utility depends on whether that request is fulfilled. By definition, a request is fulfilled if the machine pays at least the requested amount. If the voter's request is fulfilled, according to the setup above, she votes for the machine and receives policy utility  $-x$  and benefit  $b_\lambda(x)$ . But if her request is unfulfilled, she votes for the opposition and receives policy utility  $-(1-x)$  and benefit  $b_\lambda(x)$ . Recall the benefit  $b_\lambda(x)$  is a function of the voter strategies  $\lambda$ ; analyses below show in equilibrium a voter receives no payment ( $b_\lambda(x) = 0$ ) when her request is unfulfilled and

she votes for the opposition. Summarizing this setup, the utility function of a voter with ideal point  $x$ , as a function of voter and machine strategies, is given as follows:

$$u_x(b, \lambda) = \begin{cases} -x + \gamma b_\lambda(x), & b_\lambda(x) \geq \lambda(x) \\ -(1-x) + \gamma b_\lambda(x), & b_\lambda(x) < \lambda(x) \end{cases} \tag{1}$$

The machine has a budget  $B > 0$  to respond to citizen requests. We assume  $B < \gamma^{-1}$ , ensuring that the budget cannot buy the entire electorate. The machine distributes benefits to voters to maximize its vote share, subject to the budget constraint. The machine’s budget constraint is given as  $\int_{x=0}^1 b_\lambda(x) dx \leq B$ , and its utility function (which is equal to its vote share) is given as follows:

$$U(b, \lambda) = \int_{x=0}^1 1\{b_\lambda(x) \geq \lambda(x)\} dx. \tag{2}$$

The model employs Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium as the solution concept. In the first stage, each voter chooses a request strategy. In the second stage, the machine chooses a payment strategy, given all voter requests. We let  $\lambda_{-x}$  denote the strategies of all voters except  $x$ . A Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium is defined below:

A *Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium* is a strategy profile  $(\lambda^*, b^*)$  such that

1. Each voter chooses a request to maximize her utility given all other voters and the machine play the equilibrium strategy:

$$\lambda^*(x) = \arg \max_{\lambda(x) \in [0, \infty]} u_x(b^*, \lambda_{-x}^*, \lambda(x)) \text{ for all } x. \tag{3}$$

2. At each history for the machine, given a strategy played by voters in the first stage, the machine chooses payments to maximize its utility subject to the budget constraint:

$$b_\lambda^* = \arg \max_{b: b_\lambda(x) \geq 0, \int_{x=0}^1 b_\lambda(x) dx \leq B} U(b_\lambda, \lambda) \text{ for all } \lambda. \tag{4}$$

A main result—the machine predominantly fulfills requests of its supporters—is now presented in Proposition 1. The discussion below provides intuition about this proposition; the online appendix states it more precisely and provides a formal proof.<sup>24</sup>

**Proposition 1:** In equilibrium, the machine fulfills requests of a coalition of voters ranging from its strongest supporter, with an ideal point of 0, to the voter with an ideal point of  $x^* = (1 + \sqrt{1 + 8\gamma B})/4$ . All voters with  $0 \leq x \leq x^*$  receive a payment of  $b = (2x^* - 1)/\gamma$  and vote for the machine. All voters with  $x^* < x \leq 1$  receive no payment and vote for the opposition. The share of voters whose requests are fulfilled is given by  $s = x^*$ .

*Informal proof of Proposition 1.* Employing subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as the solution concept, this game can be solved by backward induction. We first consider the strategy the machine plays when observing voters play strategy  $\lambda$ . For each voter  $x$ , the machine will offer either 0 or exactly the voter’s request  $\lambda(x)$ . If the machine chooses to fulfill a voter’s request, it will do so as cheaply as possible, by paying the voter exactly her request,  $\lambda(x)$ . But if the machine does not fulfill the voter’s request in its entirety, the voter will cast a ballot for the opposition. In that case, it can conserve resources by paying the voter nothing. When choosing whose requests to fulfill, the machine will select the cheapest voters—those with the lowest value of  $\lambda(x)$ . Thus, there exists some cutoff  $\tau$ , such that the machine pays exactly the voters’ requests of  $\lambda(x)$  for all voters with  $\lambda(x) \leq \tau$  and pays 0 to all other voters.

The next step in backward induction is to examine the first stage. The voter realizes that if she requests  $\tau$ , her request will be fulfilled and she will be committed to vote for the machine. In this case, she will receive utility  $-x + \gamma\tau$ . If she requests less than  $\lambda(x) < \tau$ , then her request will be fulfilled and she will receive utility  $-x + \gamma\lambda(x) < -x + \gamma\tau$ ; thus, no voter will ever request less than  $\tau$ . If a voter requests more than  $\tau$ , the machine will pay her nothing, she will be committed to vote against the machine, and she will receive  $-(1-x)$ . Observe  $-x + \gamma\tau \geq -(1-x)$  if and only if  $x \leq (1 + \gamma\tau)/2$ , so all voters with  $x \leq (1 + \gamma\tau)/2$  will request  $\tau$  and all voters with  $x > (1 + \gamma\tau)/2$  will request a greater amount, which they know will not be honored.

Given the strategy of voters, the machine will receive utility  $\int_{x=0}^{(1+\gamma\tau)/2} 1 \{b_\lambda(x) \geq \lambda(x)\} dx = \int_0^{(1+\gamma\tau)/2} dx = (1 + \gamma\tau)/2$  subject to the positivity constraint  $\tau \geq 0$  and the budget constraint,  $\int_{x=0}^{(1+\gamma\tau)/2} b_\lambda(x) dx = \int_{x=0}^{(1+\gamma\tau)/2} \tau dx = \tau(1 + \gamma\tau)/2 \leq B$ . As the machine’s utility is strictly increasing in  $\tau$ , it will spend its entire budget and set  $\tau(1 + \gamma\tau)/2 = B$ , which implies  $\tau = (-1 + \sqrt{1 + 8\gamma B})/2\gamma$  (the only positive root of the quadratic equation  $\tau(1 + \gamma\tau)/2 = B$ ). Based on this result,  $x^* = (1 + \gamma\tau)/2 = (1 + \sqrt{1 + 8\gamma B})/4$  which implies  $\tau = (2x^* - 1)/\gamma$ . The share of voters whose requests are fulfilled by the machine in equilibrium is given by  $s = x^*$ . It can be verified that  $s < 1$  when  $B < \gamma^{-1}$ .

Proposition 1 suggests one reason why machines deliver benefits to supporters—they fulfill requests of such constituents. Our model also reveals how patterns of request fulfilling are affected by the salience of handouts and by the machine's budget. In particular, the term  $s$  can also be interpreted as how many requests the machine fulfills. To investigate factors affecting the quantity of requests, comparative statics of  $s$  are derived with respect to  $\gamma$  (the importance voters place on particularistic benefits relative to ideological preferences) and  $B$  (the machine's budget). In addition, to investigate factors affecting how much the machine pays to fulfill each request, comparative statics for  $\tau$  (the benefit paid by the machine) are derived with respect to  $\gamma$  and  $B$ . Through differentiation of expressions for  $s$  and  $\tau$ , comparative statics are derived:

**Proposition 2:**

As voters place greater weight on handouts relative to ideological preferences,

1. the quantity of requests fulfilled increases ( $\partial s / \partial \gamma = B / \sqrt{1 + 8\gamma B} > 0$ )
2. the size of requests fulfilled decreases ( $\partial \tau / \partial \gamma = (\sqrt{1 + 8\gamma B} - (1 + 4\gamma B)) / 2\gamma^2 < 0$ )

As the machine's budget increases,

3. the quantity of requests fulfilled increases ( $\partial s / \partial B = \gamma / \sqrt{1 + 8\gamma B} > 0$ )
4. the size of requests fulfilled increases ( $\partial \tau / \partial B = 2 / \sqrt{1 + 8\gamma B} > 0$ )

Later sections extensively discuss and test implications of formal results. The online appendix provides formal proofs of results, and shows that they are robust to a wide range of modeling assumptions. More specifically, the appendix shows that findings are robust to a more general model relaxing many assumptions above and allowing for:

1. arbitrary distributions of ideological preferences
2. multi-dimensional ideological preferences
3. relaxing the assumption that all voters place identical weight on particularistic benefits in their utility functions
4. relaxing the assumption that the machine maximizes vote share
5. relaxing the assumption that voters' ideological utility has the city block form

The online appendix describes a more general model, demonstrates that the base model above is a special case of it, characterizes its equilibrium, and proves that an equilibrium exists.

Three aspects of the base model warrant clarification. The first pertains to how requests are interpreted, given that in reality all voters do not make

requests. In the model, all citizens request a benefit, ranging from 0 to  $\infty$ , but the machine only fulfills some requests. The model's requirement that all voters make requests simplifies the formalization; however, unfulfilled requests can be interpreted as insincere and non-requests.<sup>25</sup>

A second clarification pertains to opportunistic defection. Given the ubiquity of the secret ballot, why do machines expect votes from citizens whose requests they fulfill? A first explanation involves reciprocity, often considered an important mechanism underpinning clientelism (e.g., Finan & Schechter, 2012; Lawson & Greene, 2014). Experiments in behavioral economics suggest that citizens often respond in kind when rewarded through "positive reciprocity," and often retaliate otherwise through "negative reciprocity" (see Fehr & Gächter, 2000). A second explanation involves monitoring. Despite the secret ballot's *de jure* existence, voters may (accurately or inaccurately) fear that it is violable such that politicians can observe their votes. Recent survey evidence suggests that even in the United States, many voters do not trust ballot secrecy (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, & Dowling, 2012). Furthermore, machines may monitor voters through aggregate election results (Rueda, 2015), or simply by asking citizens about their vote choices as many find it difficult to lie (Stokes, 2005). Overall, reciprocity and monitoring help to inhibit opportunistic defection.

A final clarification pertains to the order of play, a distinguishing feature of our analysis. Whereas we assume that voters move first by initiating requests, all extant models of clientelism assume instead that the machine moves first (e.g., Lindbeck & Weibull, 1987; Stokes, 2005). The order of play has important implications about bargaining power, as clarified through the example of a simple ultimatum game. Suppose two players must decide how to divide a dollar—Player 1 makes an offer and Player 2 decides whether to accept or reject. A well-known result is that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium involves Player 1 getting the entire dollar. Allowing a player to move first essentially assigns her all of the bargaining power over the surplus.<sup>26</sup> More generally, in bargaining games, the order of play or the proposal probabilities are thought of as capturing the bargaining power of the players (Yildiz, 2003). Thus, an implicit and often unrecognized fact is that the formal literature on clientelism bestows *all* bargaining power on machines by assuming that they move first. By contrast, we bestow all bargaining power on citizens by assuming that they move first by requesting benefits. Either assumption is clearly an abstraction, but the qualitative evidence of citizen-initiated clientelism above underscores the importance of investigating implications when the conventional assumption is challenged. While we do not claim that *all* voters hold disproportionate bargaining power over politicians, our analyses below suggest that in contexts where clientelism is often

citizen-initiated, our request-fulfilling model can explain important empirical patterns.

### *Competitive Clientelism*

The primary result of our formal analysis—machines predominantly fulfill requests of their own supporters—also holds when examining competitive clientelism. To investigate, we assume that two machines compete for votes, with budgets  $B_1 \geq 0$  and  $B_2 \geq 0$ , respectively. Voters are characterized by their ideal points  $x$ , which are uniformly distributed over the unit interval. The game proceeds as follows: Each voter makes a demand of  $\lambda(x)$ . A positive value of  $\lambda(x)$  means a citizen will only vote for Party 1 if the offer she receives from Party 1 is of magnitude  $\lambda(x)$  greater than the offer she receives from Party 2. By contrast, a negative value of  $\lambda(x)$  means a citizen will only vote for Party 2 if the offer she receives from Party 2 is of magnitude  $-\lambda(x)$  greater than the offer she receives from Party 1. After voter demands are made, Party 1 and Party 2 make offers  $b_1(x) \geq 0$  and  $b_2(x) \geq 0$  to all voters, which must satisfy the budget constraints,  $\int_{x=0}^1 b_1(x) dx \leq B_1$  and  $\int_{x=0}^1 b_2(x) dx \leq B_2$ . If  $b_1(x) - b_2(x) > \lambda(x)$ , then the citizen votes for Party 1, if  $b_1(x) - b_2(x) < \lambda(x)$ , she votes for Party 2, and if  $b_1(x) - b_2(x) = \lambda(x)$ , she is indifferent.

The online appendix demonstrates in equilibrium, each party buys a coalition of voters including its strongest supporters up to some marginal voter  $x^*$ . More specifically,

**Proposition 3:** In equilibrium, there exists a unique  $x^*$ , such that Party 1 buys a coalition of voters with ideal points ranging from 0 to  $x^*$  and Party 2 buys a coalition of voters with ideal points ranging from  $x^*$  to 1.

Thus, analogous to monopolistic clientelism, each machine focuses on its own supporters when fulfilling requests. Based on the propositions above, we now examine testable implications.

### *Empirical Implications of the Request-Fulfilling Model*

The formal analyses above yield several empirical implications about which citizens receive clientelist benefits. Implications of the request-fulfilling model diverge from those of prominent models of top-down clientelist strategies, setting the stage for econometric tests using survey data.

We contrast the implications of request fulfilling to those of four elite targeting strategies analyzed in the formal literature: vote buying, turnout

buying, abstention buying, and broker mediation. As discussed above, Stokes's (2005) vote-buying model suggests that machines reward weakly opposed voters for switching their vote choices, whereas Nichter's (2008) turnout-buying model suggests that they reward nonvoting supporters to induce electoral participation. Gans-Morse et al. (2014) examine how machines combine these two strategies with abstention buying, a phenomenon in which machines reward opposed voters for staying home on Election Day.<sup>27</sup> By contrast, Stokes et al.'s (2013) broker-mediation model suggests that party leaders target weakly opposed voters, but resources are diverted by brokers who find it easier to deliver rewards to supporters. Given that these four studies assume monopolistic clientelism, we heighten comparability by focusing on the case of a single machine.<sup>28</sup> At the outset, we note that some implications stem from assumptions of each respective model, while others stem from propositions and comparative statics.

Most important for our analysis, we observe that these models differ dramatically in their assumptions about who initiates clientelist exchanges. Whereas the formal analysis in Stokes (2005), Nichter (2008), Gans-Morse et al. (2014), and Stokes et al. (2013) assumes that elites initiate exchanges by offering benefits, the request-fulfilling model assumes that citizens initiate exchanges by asking for benefits. A first test of request fulfilling is thus whether citizens who ask for help disproportionately receive handouts.

Second, the models offer divergent predictions about the political preferences of constituents who receive clientelist benefits. The models of vote buying (Stokes, 2005, p. 321) and abstention buying (Gans-Morse et al., 2014, pp. 421-422) suggest that indifferent or weakly opposed constituents receive benefits. By contrast, the turnout-buying (Nichter, 2008, p. 25) and broker-mediation (Stokes et al., 2013, p. 86) models suggest that supporters receive handouts. With request fulfilling, Proposition 1 suggests that machines predominantly fulfill requests of supporters. A second test of request fulfilling is thus whether machine supporters disproportionately receive handouts.

Third, the models have different predictions regarding propensity to turn out. Nichter (2008, pp. 22-23) structures his turnout-buying model such that machines target citizens who are unlikely to participate unless rewarded. By contrast, the models of vote buying, abstention buying, and broker mediation are structured such that likely voters receive clientelist benefits (Stokes, 2005, pp. 319-321; Gans-Morse et al., 2014, pp. 421-422; Stokes et al., 2013, pp. 80-81). The request-fulfilling model follows the latter approach. Thus, a third test of request fulfilling is whether citizens who are inclined to vote receive disproportionately more handouts than citizens who are inclined not to vote.

Formal analyses also yield implications for poverty and monitoring, which help test whether request fulfilling comports with empirical evidence. However,



such evidence cannot adjudicate models because similar predictions are provided by the four alternative models discussed above. As with those studies, Proposition 2 of the request-fulfilling model suggests that the poor are more likely to receive handouts.<sup>29</sup> Also consistent with those studies, our formal analysis predicts more request fulfilling when machines can more accurately monitor citizen actions.<sup>30</sup> As Stokes (2005, pp. 322-323) and Nichter (2008, p. 28) explain, machines can more accurately monitor vote choices and turnout in small communities. Overall, poverty and monitoring suggest the extent to which request fulfilling explains observed empirical patterns but does not indicate whether it does so more effectively than alternative explanations.

In the next section, these five empirical implications are tested with survey data. To foreshadow results, regressions suggest that the data are more consistent with the request-fulfilling model than with the alternative models. Findings are robust to various socioeconomic and political controls, including proxies for broker mediation and party activism (e.g., Calvo & Murillo, 2013; Stokes et al., 2013).<sup>31</sup>

## Quantitative Evidence

By investigating the empirical implications discussed above, we now investigate which explanation provides the best account of survey data. We first reanalyze Argentine data in Stokes (2005) and Nichter (2008), and then turn to cross-national survey data from Latin America and Africa.

### Argentina

The first key test of request fulfilling is whether citizens who ask for help disproportionately receive handouts. If a machine devotes resources to fulfilling requests, then citizens who initiate requests are expected to be more likely to receive handouts, *ceteris paribus*. By contrast, the models of vote buying, turnout buying, abstention buying, and broker mediation suggest that elites initiate exchanges and provide no mechanism by which requesters are targeted. As discussed above, a simple comparison of means suggests that requesters are three times as likely to receive handouts. The first column in Table 1 shows that this basic finding holds in a logistic regression controlling for important covariates employed in Stokes (2005) and Nichter (2008). The *Requested Help* variable reflects whether a respondent has turned to a local political patron or broker over the past year.<sup>32</sup> Consistent with request fulfilling, citizens who requested help are more likely to be a recipient (significant at the 1% level).<sup>33</sup> Holding other variables at their means, a citizen who turned to a local political patron or broker is 6.2

**Table 1.** Electoral Clientelism: Argentina.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Requested help	0.796*** (0.210)	0.746*** (0.212)	0.767*** (0.216)	0.713*** (0.221)	0.759*** (0.226)	0.761*** (0.226)	0.668** (0.249)	0.759*** (0.225)
Peronist sympathizer		0.491* (0.216)		0.448* (0.227)				
Opinion of Peronists			0.384** (0.132)		0.349* (0.139)	0.350* (0.138)	0.337* (0.138)	
Voter				0.425 (0.329)	0.341 (0.350)	0.343 (0.350)	0.338 (0.350)	0.341 (0.350)
Peronists "Very Good"								0.992* (0.477)
Peronists "Good"								0.694* (0.338)
Peronists "Bad"								0.296 (0.357)
Peronists "Very Bad"								—
Party activist						-0.093 (0.640)		
Knows broker							0.235 (0.240)	
Income	-0.200** (0.072)	-0.193** (0.071)	-0.204** (0.075)	-0.195** (0.072)	-0.209** (0.076)	-0.209** (0.076)	-0.209** (0.076)	-0.209** (0.076)
Education	-0.229** (0.084)	-0.201* (0.085)	-0.203* (0.092)	-0.196* (0.087)	-0.194* (0.092)	-0.193* (0.092)	-0.198* (0.093)	-0.193* (0.092)
Housing quality	-0.232† (0.134)	-0.199 (0.135)	-0.143 (0.138)	-0.217 (0.140)	-0.155 (0.144)	-0.155 (0.144)	-0.150 (0.144)	-0.155 (0.144)
Log population	-0.135** (0.051)	-0.116* (0.052)	-0.138** (0.052)	-0.112* (0.054)	-0.129* (0.055)	-0.129* (0.055)	-0.124* (0.056)	-0.129* (0.055)
Ballot	0.594** (0.225)	0.522* (0.225)	0.491* (0.230)	0.513* (0.238)	0.474† (0.243)	0.474† (0.244)	0.467† (0.243)	0.475† (0.244)
Age	-0.014* (0.007)	-0.014* (0.007)	-0.013† (0.007)	-0.016* (0.007)	-0.016* (0.007)	-0.015* (0.007)	-0.016* (0.007)	-0.015* (0.007)
Gender	-0.157 (0.195)	-0.174 (0.196)	-0.220 (0.203)	-0.197 (0.205)	-0.255 (0.212)	-0.257 (0.212)	-0.239 (0.213)	-0.255 (0.213)
Radical sympathizer	-0.826* (0.343)	-0.530 (0.362)	-0.597† (0.353)	-0.512 (0.369)	-0.552 (0.359)	-0.550 (0.357)	-0.574 (0.359)	-0.550 (0.357)
Constant	1.728* (0.752)	1.084 (0.774)	0.531 (0.881)	0.823 (0.846)	0.337 (0.950)	0.421 (1.177)	0.018 (1.019)	0.697 (0.910)
Observations	1,584	1,584	1,490	1,493	1,413	1,413	1,413	1,413

Entries are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent Variable:

"Did you receive goods distributed by a party in the last campaign?" Coded yes = 1, no = 0. Primary independent variables: *Requested help*: Coded 1 if turned to broker or local political patron for help in past year, 0 otherwise. *Peronist sympathizer*: Coded 1 if answered Peronist party to open-ended question: "Independently of whom you have voted for in the past, which party do you like the most?," 0 otherwise. *Opinion of Peronists*: Responses to closed-ended question ("In general, what is your opinion of the Peronist Party?"), coded 1 = very bad, 2 = bad, 3 = good, 4 = very good. *Voter*: Coded 1 if voted in 1999 presidential election, 0 otherwise. See Stokes (2005) and text for description of other variables.

† $p < .10$ . \* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

percentage points more likely to receive a campaign gift (considerable given the baseline probability of gift receipt is only 7.4%). The finding that handouts are primarily received by *requesters* is most consistent with the request-fulfilling model.

Turning to the second test, recall that the request-fulfilling, turnout-buying, and broker-mediation models suggest that machines deliver rewards disproportionately to supporters, whereas the vote-buying and abstention-buying models suggest that they target indifferent or moderately opposed constituents. A simple comparison of means provides initial evidence that the Peronist machine overwhelmingly distributes handouts to its own supporters: 14.3% of Peronist sympathizers received campaign handouts, compared with only 4.7% of non-Peronist sympathizers.<sup>34</sup> Column 2 adds a *Peronist sympathizer* variable to the prior specification and similarly demonstrates that such respondents disproportionately receive clientelist benefits (significant at the 5% level), even when controlling for important covariates.<sup>35</sup> Results are also robust to using an *Opinion of Peronists* variable, in which greater values reflect more favorable evaluations of the Peronist party.<sup>36</sup> Column 3 suggests that respondents with more favorable opinions of the machine are more likely to receive rewards (significant at the 1% level). The finding that requesters predominantly receive rewards continues to hold—the coefficients on *Requested help* remain statistically significant and comparable in magnitude in both columns. Taken together, these two findings—handouts are primarily received by *requesters* and *machine supporters*—are most fully explained by the request-fulfilling model.


The third test of request fulfilling is whether voters or nonvoters are more likely to receive handouts. Recall that the turnout-buying model suggests that machines deliver rewards disproportionately to citizens who are inclined not to vote, whereas the request-fulfilling and other models suggest that they target citizens who are inclined to vote. This prediction can be tested by examining the link between rewards and past turnout, as individuals who failed to vote in previous elections may be deemed less likely to vote. To examine this relationship, Columns 4 and 5 add a *Voter* variable—a dummy corresponding to whether respondents voted in the previous presidential election—to specifications in Columns 2 and 3. First, note the robustness of earlier findings that requesters and machine supporters disproportionately receive rewards: The coefficients on *Requested help*, *Peronist sympathizer*, and *Opinion of Peronists* remain statistically significant and comparable in magnitude. However, prior voting has no significant effect on the probability of receiving rewards in either specification (though the signs are positive, consistent with request fulfilling).<sup>37</sup> This lack of statistical significance is not entirely surprising:

receiving a gift and failure to turnout are both relatively low-probability events in Argentina, with rewarded nonvoters comprising only 14 of more than 1,900 respondents.<sup>38</sup> Therefore, a larger sample size would likely be needed to obtain precise estimates of turnout's effect on receiving handouts. The next section, which addresses this issue by employing cross-national surveys with far greater sample sizes, finds that citizens who reliably turn out disproportionately receive benefits (consistent with request fulfilling).

Now consider the final two empirical implications: poverty and monitoring. As explained above, all five models predict that machines disproportionately distribute rewards to poor citizens in small communities. Thus, while findings about poverty and monitoring cannot adjudicate explanations, they can increase our confidence in an explanation corroborated by other implications discussed above. As predicted, the variable *Income* across all specifications in Table 1 suggests that poorer citizens are more likely to receive benefits (at the 1% level). In addition, the variable *Log population* suggests that citizens in small communities disproportionately receive rewards (at the 1% or 5% level in all specifications). These findings bolster evidence above that points to request fulfilling.

Overall, evidence suggests that request fulfilling provides the fullest account of Argentine data in Stokes (2005) and Nichter (2008). With respect to the empirical implications discussed above, vote buying and abstention buying are consistent with two findings (poverty and monitoring), while turnout buying and broker mediation are consistent with three findings (political preferences, poverty, and monitoring). By contrast, request fulfilling is consistent with four findings (requesting help, political preferences, poverty, and monitoring).<sup>39</sup> Before turning to cross-national evidence, we consider potential alternative explanations.

First, consider the finding that requesters disproportionately receive benefits. Perhaps the *Requested help* variable is simply a proxy for party activism: that is, the machine in fact targets its own activists with rewards, and these activists' proximity to the machine renders them more likely to initiate requests. To help address this concern, Column 6 shows that findings are robust when controlling for whether a respondent reported being active in a political party. Alternatively, one might be concerned that *Requested help* is a proxy for inclusion in a broker's network: that is, the machine actually targets citizens through intermediaries with established networks, and it is their insertion in a broker network that makes them more likely to initiate requests. To mitigate this concern, Column 7 demonstrates robustness when controlling for whether a respondent knows a political broker who lives in the neighborhood. Thus, although partisan networks and brokers are well known to play important roles in mediating clientelism (e.g., Calvo & Murillo, 2013; Schaffer & Baker, 2015; Stokes et al., 2013), we find that they do not fully explain why requesters disproportionately receive benefits.



**Figure 2.** Receipt of benefits, by predicted support for machine.

Another alternative explanation pertains to the finding that machine supporters disproportionately receive handouts. Perhaps, as Stokes (2005) suggests, benefits predominantly target weakly opposed (or indifferent) voters, whose survey responses are then “nudged” favorably by rewards (p. 324). Considering this potential endogeneity is important because respondents reported opinions about the Peronist party concurrently with reporting if they received gifts. Note that regressions suggest respondents who voted for Peronist candidates in previous elections disproportionately receive rewards (not shown). But this finding could merely reflect the fact that voting behavior is stable over time and respondents who received benefits in this election also received benefits in the past elections. A better approach is analyzing a more granular measure of the *degree* of Peronist support or opposition. Vote buying predicts that rewards target weakly opposed (or indifferent) voters, and a fundamental prediction is that machines buy off voters to their point of indifference.<sup>40</sup> If the machine buys off voters to their point of indifference and voters adjust their reported Peronist support based on these payments, weak supporters would be most likely to receive a gift. By contrast, request fulfilling predicts that strong supporters disproportionately receive rewards. Column 8 shows that contrary to vote buying, strong supporters are most likely to receive gifts.

Moreover, we introduce another approach suggesting that supporters disproportionately receive handouts. We employed a logistic regression to generate the predicted probability that each respondent is a Peronist supporter. More specifically, to help insulate from potential sources of endogeneity, we included only demographic, socioeconomic, and geographic controls to estimate the likelihood each respondent voted for the Peronist candidate in the prior presidential election. Figure 2, which employs a lowess smoother,

demonstrates that respondents predicted as more likely Peronist supporters disproportionately receive benefits. Yet again, these results suggest that supporters' greater likelihood of receiving handouts—which is consistent with request fulfilling—does not stem from endogeneity. Next, we test the request-fulfilling argument in a broader context by employing cross-national surveys.

### *Cross-National Evidence*

When considering the empirical implications outlined above, cross-national evidence is also most consistent with request fulfilling. We investigate the 2010 LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey, which includes 43,990 respondents in 26 countries, as well as the Afrobarometer Round 3 survey, which includes 25,397 respondents in 18 countries.<sup>41</sup> The LAPOP and Afrobarometer datasets are analyzed separately (given contextual and survey differences), and all regressions include country fixed effects (given cross-national differences in the prevalence of clientelism). In comparison with Stokes's (2005) Argentine data, these surveys entail advantages and disadvantages for testing. Advantages of the cross-national surveys include a broader scope to investigate generalizability and much larger sample sizes to facilitate testing the turnout implication. Their disadvantages include weaker testing of the prediction regarding political preferences because they do not reveal which parties engaged in clientelism,<sup>42</sup> and indicating only if handouts were offered (rather than received).<sup>43</sup> Notwithstanding such strengths and weaknesses, evidence from both sources points toward request fulfilling.

As before, the first test of request fulfilling is whether citizens who ask for help disproportionately experience clientelism. Recall that the request-fulfilling model suggests machines devote resources to fulfilling requests, whereas the models of vote buying, turnout buying, abstention buying, and broker mediation offer no mechanism by which requesters are targeted. LAPOP includes an excellent question that directly asks whether respondents "sought assistance from or presented a request" to municipal officials during the last year. The specification in Column 1 of Table 2 suggests that Latin American respondents who requested help are significantly more likely to receive handouts (at the 1% level), a finding robust to a broad range of controls and country fixed effects. Afrobarometer asks whether respondents contacted political party officials for "help to solve a problem or to give them your views," and then follows up to ask whether the main reason for the contact was a "personal problem." Column 5 indicates that citizens who contacted party officials about

**Table 2.** Electoral Clientelism: Cross-National.

	Latin America				Africa			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Requested help	0.763*** (0.041)	0.734*** (0.045)	0.729*** (0.047)	0.685*** (0.048)	0.765*** (0.079)	0.813*** (0.093)	0.789*** (0.094)	0.790*** (0.094)
Machine supporter		0.292*** (0.051)	0.271*** (0.052)	0.218*** (0.053)		0.416*** (0.053)	0.366*** (0.053)	
Voter			0.264*** (0.050)	0.258*** (0.051)			0.406*** (0.060)	0.405*** (0.061)
Strong machine support								0.404*** (0.056)
Weak machine support								0.188† (0.098)
Activist				0.488*** (0.067)				
Income	-0.076*** (0.021)	-0.091*** (0.023)	-0.077** (0.024)	-0.078** (0.024)	-0.120*** (0.015)	-0.145*** (0.018)	-0.147*** (0.018)	-0.149*** (0.018)
Education	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.042*** (0.011)	0.039** (0.014)	0.032* (0.014)	0.028* (0.014)
Age	-0.009*** (0.001)	-0.010*** (0.001)	-0.012*** (0.001)	-0.012*** (0.001)	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)
Gender	-0.170*** (0.033)	-0.179*** (0.036)	-0.183*** (0.037)	-0.173*** (0.037)	-0.181*** (0.037)	-0.219*** (0.047)	-0.209*** (0.047)	-0.208*** (0.047)
Urban	-0.086* (0.038)	-0.092* (0.042)	-0.031 (0.043)	-0.044 (0.044)	-0.025 (0.042)	-0.054 (0.050)	-0.038 (0.050)	-0.040 (0.050)
Constant	-1.109*** (0.105)	-1.089*** (0.111)	-1.225*** (0.114)	-1.219*** (0.115)	-0.275** (0.096)	-0.229* (0.110)	-0.459*** (0.115)	-0.432*** (0.115)
Observations	35,652	29,650	27,606	27,428	23,474	15,753	15,701	15,667

Entries are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: Coded 1 if respondents report that candidates or political parties “sometimes” or “often” offered them particularistic benefits during campaigns, 0 otherwise. See text for description of independent variables. †*p* < .10. \**p* < .05. \*\**p* < .01. \*\*\**p* < .001.

personal problems are significantly more likely to experience clientelism (significant at the 1% level). Overall, these analyses corroborate request fulfilling in both Latin America and Africa, as respondents who request assistance disproportionately experience clientelism.

Next, consider the prediction regarding political preferences. The request-fulfilling, turnout-buying, and broker-mediation models predict that machines deliver rewards predominantly to supporters, not to indifferent or weakly opposed constituents as per the vote-buying and abstention-buying models. To investigate which explanation is more consistent with cross-national data, we build on a test adopted by Stokes et al. (2013). Their

analysis of Venezuela uses as a proxy for supporters whether respondents identify with any political party. To hone in on whether citizens identifying with *machine* parties are more likely recipients, we incorporated data from Kitschelt's (2011b) expert survey on the level of clientelism conducted by major parties in 88 countries.<sup>44</sup> More specifically, we coded whether each respondent identified with a party that experts in Kitschelt's survey on average identified as engaging in "moderate" or "major" clientelist efforts.<sup>45</sup> In both Latin America (Column 2) and Africa (Column 6), citizens who identify with a machine have a higher probability of experiencing clientelism at a 1% level of significance. The finding that requesters disproportionately receive rewards remains robust—the coefficients on *Requested help* continue to be statistically significant and similar in magnitude. When considered together, these two findings—rewards are primarily received by *requesters* and *machine supporters*—are more consistent with the request-fulfilling model than the four alternative models discussed above.

We next examine the third test of request fulfilling: whether rewards are disproportionately received by individuals who reliably turn out. Recall that the turnout-buying model indicates that machines deliver rewards predominantly to citizens who are inclined not to vote, unlike the request-fulfilling and other models that suggest they target those who are inclined to vote. Cross-national data provide strong evidence that likely voters are significantly more likely to experience clientelism. As with Argentine analyses above, regressions in Table 2 include a *Voter* dummy corresponding to whether a citizen reported voting in the previous election. In both Latin America (Column 3) and Africa (Column 7), specifications suggest that citizens who voted in the previous election have a significantly higher probability of experiencing clientelism (at the 1% level) even when including numerous controls and country fixed effects. This finding is robust to alternative measures of likely voters, such as whether respondents are registered to vote and the predicted probability of voting generated from a logistic regression of socioeconomic variables (not shown). And again, observe the robustness of earlier specifications: the coefficients on *Requested help* and *Machine supporter* continue to be statistically significant and comparable in magnitude. This combination of findings—rewards are primarily received by *requesters*, *machine supporters*, and *likely voters*—is most consonant with predictions of the request-fulfilling model.

Finally, we turn to poverty and monitoring, the final two empirical implications elaborated above. Recall that these factors cannot adjudicate between request fulfilling and the four alternative models, which all predict that machines disproportionately distribute rewards to poor citizens in small communities. In line with predictions, the coefficient on *Income* is negative



and statistically significant across all specifications in Table 2 (at the 1% level). Also consistent with predictions, the coefficient on *Urban* is negative across all specifications, suggesting that city dwellers have relatively less exposure to machine politics. However, this finding is only statistically significant in Latin America and only in two specifications (at the 5% level in Columns 1 and 2). In sum, cross-national evidence on poverty and monitoring is relatively consistent with request fulfilling as well as alternative explanations, though findings for monitoring are not as robust as in the Argentine case.

Altogether, specifications in Table 2 suggest that request fulfilling provides the fullest account of cross-national data. Just as with the Argentine case, investigating the empirical implications outlined above suggests that findings from both Africa and Latin America are more consistent with the request-fulfilling model than with four top-down explanations analyzed in the formal literature. More specifically, only three findings are consistent with vote buying (turnout, poverty, and monitoring), turnout buying (political preferences, poverty, and monitoring), and abstention buying (turnout, poverty, and monitoring), and only four findings are consistent with broker mediation (political preferences, turnout, poverty, and monitoring). By contrast, five findings are consistent with request fulfilling (requesting help, political preferences, turnout, poverty, and monitoring).

We next consider alternative explanations examined in the case of Argentina. First, we consider whether requesters disproportionately experience clientelism simply because they interact more frequently with partisan networks. Column 4 includes a control for whether respondents frequently attended party meetings, a question included in LAPOP but not Afrobarometer.<sup>46</sup> As would be expected by Calvo and Murillo (2013) and Stokes et al. (2013), these party activists are more likely to receive offers. Nevertheless, the variables *Requested help*, *Machine supporter*, and *Voter* remain approximately equal in magnitude and highly statistically significant. Thus, although party activism plays an important role in clientelism, it does not fully explain why requesters, supporters, and likely voters disproportionately experience clientelism.<sup>47</sup> Request fulfilling provides an explanation for these empirical patterns observed in both continents.

Second, given that we lack a measure of party identification *before* clientelist offers, endogeneity is a concern. Afrobarometer (but not LAPOP) includes a question about strength of party identification, so we can again test whether strong supporters disproportionately experience clientelism. We generated a three-point scale of whether a respondent strongly, weakly, or did not identify with a machine party. Column 8 reveals a monotonic relationship between the degree of machine support and the probability of experiencing

clientelism, in which strong supporters are most likely to receive offers. This evidence is consistent with request fulfilling and belies the alternative explanation that recipients identify with machines only *because* they experienced clientelism.

As acknowledged, the Argentine, LAPOP, and Afrobarometer datasets each have relative strengths and weaknesses. Nevertheless, when findings are considered holistically, they suggest that evidence is more consistent with request fulfilling than with alternative explanations.

## Conclusion

While most studies depict clientelism as a phenomenon that is firmly under elite control, we emphasize the important role of citizen demands in clientelism. Citizens often initiate requests for benefits and may vote for a competitor if requests are unfulfilled. We argue that much of what is considered to be vote-buying, turnout-buying, and other top-down strategies is actually request fulfilling.

This article provides insights into the logic of request fulfilling. Formal analyses suggest that when citizens request handouts, machines are most likely to fulfill requests of supporters who reliably turn out. A reanalysis of Argentine survey data in Stokes (2005) and Nichter (2008)—as well as cross-national evidence from Africa and Latin America—reveals patterns of machine politics consistent with these and other implications of our request-fulfilling model. Analyses suggest that request fulfilling provides a better account of data than alternative explanations.

Future research should extend our formal and empirical analyses. For example, to facilitate exposition we investigate request fulfilling to influence vote choices (i.e., persuasion), not request fulfilling to influence participation (i.e., mobilization). Given that machines often employ a portfolio of clientelist strategies (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2016; Gans-Morse et al., 2014), future work should examine how machines allocate resources across request fulfilling and other strategies for the purposes of persuasion *and* mobilization. In addition, improved data collection would enable testing of additional predictions of our request-fulfilling model (e.g., pertaining to reward size). Such formal and empirical extensions may yield new insights into request fulfilling and broader patterns of clientelism.

Request fulfilling warrants attention in part due to its normative significance. Many scholars consider clientelism to involve “perverse accountability” (Stokes, 2005), in which citizens are accountable to machines but not vice versa. But the logic of request fulfilling suggests that when citizens ask machines for help, they can hold machines accountable by conditioning political support. Potential

backlash provides machines incentives to be responsive to constituent demands. Such accountability and responsiveness might suggest that request fulfilling is less pernicious than vote buying. Nevertheless, request fulfilling can be problematic for various reasons, including preferential treatment of supporters, incentives to underprovide public goods, and commodification of voting. More broadly, normative implications heighten the importance of distinguishing request fulfilling from other forms of clientelism.

Request fulfilling underscores the strategic role of citizens in clientelism, yielding distinctive predictions that are more congruent with global evidence than existing explanations. Our study is the first to focus on citizen-initiated clientelist exchanges, but we anticipate that this research trajectory will reveal other important strategies. By examining the strategies of citizens as well as elites, researchers can continue to push the frontier of a topic advancing substantially in recent years—the puzzle of machine politics.

### **Acknowledgments**

The authors thank Avi Acharya, David Collier, Jordan Gans-Morse, Jee Seon Jeon, Benjamin Lessing, Sebastian Mazzuca, Salvatore Nunnari, Miguel Rueda, Marcelo Rufino Rodrigues, and Rodrigo Zarazaga. Simeon Nichter acknowledges support from the National Science Foundation, the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, and the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University.

### **Declaration of Conflicting Interests**

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

### **Funding**

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

### **Notes**

1. Interview by Simeon Nichter; municipality with 10,000 citizens in Bahia state (November 24, 2008). In Brazil, councilors (*vereadores*) serve on the city council, a municipality's legislative body.
2. We investigate evidence from Argentina and Brazil, and cross-nationally from Africa and Latin America. Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, and Brusco (2013), which is discussed below, suggest that handouts predominantly target voting supporters in Argentina, India, Mexico, and Venezuela.
3. Unless otherwise specified, all interviews discussed below were conducted by Simeon Nichter in municipalities with 100,000 citizens or fewer in each of Bahia's seven "mesoregions," as well as in Pernambuco. Nearly half of Brazilians live in municipalities of this size. See the online appendix for details.

4. Survey by research firm Datafolha in 2009 in 150 municipalities ( $N = 2,133$ ).
5. Survey conducted in 40 municipalities by Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro, and Simeon Nichter in 2012 ( $N = 3,668$ ).
6. Author's interview, municipality with 15,000 citizens (January 14, 2009).
7. Author's interview, municipality with 10,000 citizens (November 24, 2008).
8. Author's interview, municipality with 10,000 citizens (September 26, 2008).
9. Author's interview, municipality with 60,000 citizens (November 5, 2008).
10. Author's interview, municipality with 10,000 citizens (November 24, 2008).
11. Author's interview, municipality with 80,000 citizens (November 20, 2008).
12. Author's interview, municipality with 10,000 citizens (September 30, 2008).
13. Author's interview, municipality with 50,000 citizens (November 11, 2008).
14. Author's interview, municipality with 15,000 citizens (January 14, 2009).
15. Author's interview, municipality with 50,000 citizens (November 13, 2008).
16. Personal communication, September 25, 2013.
17. The authors thank Rodrigo Zarazaga for several unpublished quotations referenced here and below.
18. Unpublished interview by Rodrigo Zarazaga; Conurbano, Argentina (July 14, 2009).
19. Unpublished interview by Rodrigo Zarazaga; Conurbano, Argentina (December 7, 2010).
20. Both Stokes (2005) and Nichter (2008) use the "Opinion of Peronist Party" question to examine preferences. The issue of endogeneity is discussed below.
21. We do not examine the role of turnout; see Conclusion for further discussion.
22. As discussed below, assuming that all citizens make requests simplifies analysis. However, some citizens will ask for infinite amounts, which are interpretable as non-requests.
23. Survey of approximately 800 councilors and brokers in four provinces conducted by Stokes et al. in 2009 to 2011. The survey question defines the core supporter as a person who "*always* goes to vote and prefers the candidate you support" (emphasis in original).
24. This section does not examine technical issues relating to the fact that the machine's strategy is only pinned down on a set of measure 1. These considerations, which complicate proof but do not change their intuition, are examined thoroughly in the online appendix.
25. We could allow for non-requests explicitly in the model by enlarging the voter's strategy space to  $\lambda(x) \in [0, \infty] \cup \omega$ , where  $\omega$  indicates a non-request and where the citizen votes sincerely based on policy distance if  $\lambda(x) = \omega$ . This modification would not affect our main results. We could go one step further and include a cost  $c > 0$  of making a request. In this case, our results would be qualitatively unchanged, though the interval of voters receiving benefits would contract by  $c$ .
26. A key underlying assumption is that the first mover credibly commits to her proposal; otherwise, moving first involves mere cheap talk and confers no bargaining power.
27. For excellent empirical work on abstention buying, see Cox and Kousser (1981). Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter's (2014) model also encompasses vote

- buying and turnout buying, for which predictions are consistent with Stokes (2005) and Nichter (2008). It also examines double persuasion, which rewards nonvoting opposers for turning out and voting against their preferences.
28. Our predictions are robust to competitive clientelism.
  29. More precisely, given that for ease of exposition  $\gamma$  is fixed across individuals in the above model, Proposition 2 suggests that machines engage in more request fulfilling when the electorate is poorer. The generalized model in the appendix allows  $\gamma$  to vary across individuals, yielding the result that machines disproportionately fulfill requests of poor individuals.
  30. To simplify exposition, monitoring is not incorporated above. In an extension, we followed the approach of Gans-Morse et al. (2014) to introduce monitoring costs into the analysis (available upon request). With this setup, the machine pays a lower benefit to voters who are costlier to monitor, and pays nothing to voters who are sufficiently costly to monitor. Empirical implications discussed here do not change when incorporating monitoring costs.
  31. Although we include a control related to Calvo and Murillo's (2013) partisan network argument, we cannot do so for Finan and Schechter's (2012) reciprocity argument: the Argentine, LAPOP, and Afrobarometer surveys employed below include no appropriate questions. Neither study is discussed in this section as they do not conduct formal analyses.
  32. See Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes (2004). The past year includes but extends beyond the campaign. Data on requesting help specifically during the campaign are unavailable.
  33. Results remain significant if *Requested help* is recoded to include only requests of local political patrons, or alternatively if recoding to include only requests of brokers.
  34. "Peronist sympathizers" identify the Peronist party as their favorite party without prompting. Findings are similar when using previous vote choices for Peronist candidates.
  35. Holding other variables at their means, Peronist sympathizers are 3.3 percentage points more likely to receive gifts (considerable given a baseline probability of just 7.4%).
  36. Stokes (2005) and Nichter (2008) also employ this question to examine preferences.
  37. Additional analyses suggest that all interactions of *Voter* with variables used to test Peronist support and requesting help are similarly insignificant (not shown).
  38. Canton and Jorrat (2003) argue that Argentina's enforcement of compulsory voting is weak; 14.5% of this survey's respondents reported not voting in the prior presidential election.
  39. For comparability, this section reanalyzed data in Stokes (2005) and Nichter (2008). Findings are similar when examining LAPOP's 2010 Argentine data. Vote buying and abstention buying are only consistent with one finding (monitoring), whereas turnout buying and broker mediation are consistent with two

- findings (political preferences and monitoring). By contrast, request fulfilling is consistent with three findings (requesting help, political preferences, and monitoring). This analysis employed specifications in Table 2, subsetting on the 1,410 Argentine respondents (not shown).
40. This prediction is implicit in Stokes (2005) because her model assumes that the benefit size is fixed. It is more explicit in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Gans-Morse et al. (2014).
  41. Surveys chosen due to inclusion of clientelism questions. Canada and United States excluded from LAPOP analyses. Afrobarometer's Round 3 survey conducted interviews in 2005 and 2006.
  42. Although Stokes's (2005) survey also does not ask which party provided rewards, she argues that the Peronist party is "by far the most active in distributing private rewards" (p. 322).
  43. The cross-national surveys ask if politicians offered benefits but do not ascertain whether offers were fulfilled. By contrast, Stokes's survey asks specifically about handouts received.
  44. Survey conducted in 2008 to 2009 in all democratic polities with at least two million citizens.
  45. Analysis based on subset of countries covered by Kitschelt's survey (81% of LAPOP countries and 67% of Afrobarometer countries). Results also hold when analyzing if respondents identify with *any* party (includes all LAPOP and Afrobarometer countries).
  46. Coded as attending at least one to two times monthly. Results are robust to alternative codings.
  47. Unlike the Argentine survey, LAPOP and Afrobarometer do not include questions about brokers, preventing inclusion of a proxy for insertion in a broker's network.

## References

- Archer, R. P. (1990, July). *The transition from traditional to broker clientelism in Colombia: Political stability and social unrest* (Working Paper No. 140). Notre Dame, IN: Kellogg Institute for International Studies.
- Auyero, J. (2000). *Poor people's politics: Peronist survival networks and the legacy of Evita*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Banfield, E. C., & Wilson, J. Q. (1963). *City politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Brusco, V., Nazareno, M., & Stokes, S. C. (2004). Vote buying in Argentina. *Latin American Research Review*, 39(2), 66-88.
- Calvo, E., & Murillo, M. (2013). When parties meet voters: Partisan networks and distributive expectations in Argentina and Chile. *Comparative Political Studies*, 46, 851-882.
- Canton, D., & Jorrot, J. (2003). Abstention in Argentine presidential elections, 1983-1999. *Latin American Research Review*, 38(1), 187-201.

- Cornelius, W. A. (1977). Leaders, followers, and official patrons in urban Mexico. In S. W. Schmidt, L. Guasti, C. Landé, & J. C. Scott (Eds.), *Friends, followers, and factions: A reader in political clientelism* (pp. 337-353). Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Cox, G. W., & Kousser, J. M. (1981). Turnout and rural corruption: New York as a test case. *American Journal of Political Science*, 25, 646-663.
- Diaz-Cayeros, A., Estévez, F., & Magaloni, B. (2016). *The political logic of poverty relief: Electoral strategies and social policy in Mexico*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000). Fairness and retaliation: The economics of reciprocity. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 14(3), 159-181.
- Finan, F., & Schechter, L. (2012). Vote-buying and reciprocity. *Econometrica*, 80, 863-881.
- Gans-Morse, J., Mazzuca, S., & Nichter, S. (2014). Varieties of clientelism: Machine politics during elections. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58, 415-432.
- Gay, R. (2006). The even more difficult transition from clientelism to citizenship: Lessons from Brazil. In P. Fernández-Kelly & J. Shefner (Eds.), *Out of the shadows: Political action and the informal economy in Latin America* (pp. 195-217). University Park: Penn State University Press.
- Gerber, A. S., Huber, G. A., Doherty, D., & Dowling, C. M. (2012). Is there a secret ballot? Ballot secrecy perceptions and their implications for voting behaviour. *British Journal of Political Science*, 43, 77-102.
- Hilgers, T. (2012). *Clientelism in everyday Latin American politics*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kitschelt, H. (2011a). *Clientelistic linkage strategies: A descriptive exploration*. Paper prepared for the Workshop on Democratic Accountability Strategies, Duke University, Durham, NC.
- Kitschelt, H. (2011b). *Democratic accountability and linkages project*. Durham, NC: Duke University.
- Kitschelt, H., & Wilkinson, S. (2007). *Patrons, clients, and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Landini, F. (2012). Prácticas clientelares y control político en la experiencia campesina de Argentina [Clientelist practices and political control in the rural experience of Argentina]. *Perfiles Latinoamericanos*, 40, 205-226.
- Lawson, C., & Greene, K. (2014). Making clientelism work: How norms of reciprocity increase voter compliance. *Comparative Politics*, 47, 61-85.
- Levitsky, S. (2003a). From labor politics to machine politics: The transformation of party-union linkages in Argentine Peronism, 1983-1999. *Latin American Research Review*, 38(3), 3-36.
- Levitsky, S. (2003b). *Transforming labor-based parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in comparative perspective*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Lindbeck, A., & Weibull, J. W. (1987). Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition. *Public Choice*, 52, 273-297.

- Magaloni, B., Diaz-Cayeros, A., & Estévez, F. (2007). Clientelism and portfolio diversification: A model of electoral investment with applications to Mexico. In H. Kitschelt & S. Wilkinson (Eds.), *Patrons, clients, and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition* (pp. 182-205). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Movimento de Combate à Corrupção Eleitoral. (2009). *Políticos cassados*. Brasília, Brazil: Author.
- Nichter, S. (2008). Vote buying or turnout buying? Machine politics and the secret ballot. *American Political Science Review*, *102*, 19-31.
- Nichter, S. (2014). Conceptualizing vote buying. *Electoral Studies*, *35*, 315-327.
- Piattoni, S. (2001). *Clientelism, interests, and democratic representation: The European experience in historical and comparative perspective*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Powell, J. D. (1970). Peasant society and clientelist politics. *American Political Science Review*, *64*, 411-425.
- Rueda, M. (2015). Buying votes with imperfect local knowledge and a secret ballot. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, *27*, 428-456.
- Schaffer, J., & Baker, A. (2015). Clientelism as persuasion-buying: Evidence from Latin America. *Comparative Political Studies*, *48*, 1093-1126.
- Scott, J. C. (1969). Corruption, machine politics, and political change. *American Political Science Review*, *63*, 1142-1158.
- Scott, J. C. (1972). Patron-client politics and political change in Southeast Asia. *American Political Science Review*, *66*, 91-113.
- Stokes, S. C. (2005). Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina. *American Political Science Review*, *99*, 315-325.
- Stokes, S. C., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M., & Brusco, V. (2013). *Brokers, voters and clientelism*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Szwarcberg, M. (2013). The microfoundations of political clientelism: Lessons from the Argentine case. *Latin American Research Review*, *48*(2), 32-54.
- Taylor-Robinson, M. M. (2010). *Do the poor count? Democratic institutions and accountability in a context of poverty*. University Park: Penn State University Press.
- Weitz-Shapiro, R. (2012). What wins votes: Why some politicians opt out of clientelism. *American Journal of Political Science*, *56*, 568-583.
- Yildiz, M. (2003). Bargaining without a common prior: An immediate agreement theorem. *Econometrica*, *71*, 793-811.
- Zarazaga, R. (2014). Brokers beyond clientelism: A new perspective on brokerage through the Argentine case. *Latin American Politics and Society*, *56*(3), 23-45.

## Author Biographies

**Simeon Nichter** is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of California, San Diego. His ongoing research explores the political voice of poor citizens in emerging democracies, with central reference to Latin America.

**Michael Peress** is an Associate Professor of Political Science at SUNY-Stony Brook. His research interests include voting behavior, legislative institutions, methodology, and formal theory.